

THAI POLITICS : THE TRANSITION AND TRANSFORMATION

Abstract

The challenges of democracy among Southeast Asian countries and the disruption of democracy in Thailand, particularly in the recent Thai coup d'état in 2014, are undoubtedly the reasons for continued interest in the politics of Thailand. It is gratifying to have the chance to reflect on the continuing validity of the assessment several years later and ask whether the trends that seemed to dominate five years ago are still so today. This study focuses on Thai politics in the transition and transformation period since General Prayut Chan-o-cha took power in 2014 and following Thailand's 2019 election that General Prayut Chan-o-cha returned for a second term as Prime Minister. This study offers data on the political context of Thailand, Dictatorship Democracy in Thailand, democratic development and challenge in Thailand's politics, authoritarianism and hybrid democracy in Southeast Asia, and the 2019 Thai election results and the future of Thailand's politics. For everyone in society, the political situation is influential as the transition and transformation in government policy is essential information as people can approach and adapt to the new information update and deal with the new situation in the near future.

Keywords: Coup d'état in Thai Politics, Dictatorship, Democracy, Military Seizes Power, Authoritarianism, Transition, Transformation

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I. INTRODUCTION

The term "Military Dictatorship" can be described as the uncharitable meaning of the law by a military officer who comes to authority through a coup, including not holding legitimate elections.

It was the end of the condition of chaos in political disputes, when "Big Tu" General Prayut Chan-o-cha, led the group of commanders, General Prajin Chan Tong, General. Adul Sangsingkaew and General Woraphong Sa-ngamet, Deputy Director-General (Representative) General Thanasak Patimaprakorn, A bloodless coup d'état was launched by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) team when the political deadlock was realized.

The coup was proclaimed as an ingenious technique of breaking down and reducing conflict, restoring peace to the nation, stopping corrupt politicians, restoring unity to Thai society, and eliminating the rift in Thai society.

The army announced the "Martial Law" by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) only overnight and led to the establishment of the NCPO. Therefore, it became the subject of talking about the city moment, immediately famous throughout the world, because most foreign news agencies had continuously reported news about the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) seizure of power from Yingluck's government that finally stopped the nation's chaos.

Thailand has a lengthy history of military regimes and politically engaged military action. At least 18 coups and attempted coups have taken place since 1932. Authoritarian rule defined the three decades after World War II (1950s, 1960s, and 1970s).

In Thailand politics, the king, religion, country, and democracy are essential. The king or monarchy is a sign of the country as a unified entity and political conservatism. The Thai ruling class took pride in its bloodless revolution in 1932 that maintained king and domestic unity. Its members took satisfaction from the fact that the type of government has been "up to date" without influencing their position, disturbing the lengthy and venerable traditions of good government.

Religion is a symbol of cultural conservatism and unity. It highest and lowest in what is seen as a just and natural scale of status and right. While monarchy and religion are symbols of universal meaning among Thais, nationalism is most vital in the ruling class. However, several decades of domestic education and widespread military service have rendered symbols and slogans of nationalism current at all social levels. Thai nationalism is for the most part

militant. Thailand succeeded in this struggle through a process of adapting itself to the ways of the imperialist powers and deemphasizing its dissimilarities. Because of this history, Thai nationalism is different from other Southeast Asian nations; a struggle to maintain independence.

Democracy is also a slogan generally accepted by the ruling class. It symbolizes a combination of a sense of duty, of noblesse oblige, on the one hand and the end of special legal privilege on the other. When reduced to specifics, the democratic ideal is found to mean the fully elected parliament controlling the government, the purposes of which are the democratic ideal is found to mean a people's happiness and prosperity. These ends are an ancient objective of Thai government.

Hybrid system is a combination of two systems. Thailand democracy is able to be described as a hybrid style, a combination of authoritarianism and democracy.

The Siamese revolution of 1932 was a crucial turning point in 20th-century Thai history, which changed the system of government in Siam from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. The first military took place just one year after 1932 revolution, since then there were 13 success coup repeatedly happened from the past to the present.

In the past, military democracy was rather frightened. At present there is nothing, if anyone does anything right. Then live a normal life will see that in some areas. In 2006 coup, there were people taking pictures with soldiers and giving rose to them. Some were taking pictures congratulate that unlike some countries, such as Egypt, Syria, Ukraine, etc. The military and some groups of people are not well compatible.

A Thai-style democracy can imply little more than a scheme of various institutions representing elite interests that can override or undermine elected officials by common vote.

Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat first embraced the concept of Thai-style democracy, who took power in 1957 and ultimately became prime minister. Sarit, also an authoritarian figure, ousted dictator Plaek Phibulsongkram and set up a Thailand Revolutionary Council. Sarit's Revolutionary Council announced in one of its oldest proclamations:

“The Revolutionary Council’s aim is to turn Thailand into a democratic state. We view that to achieve this goal, we must correct the mistakes of the past, resulting in the need for a coup on October 20th, B.E 2501, so that we can fully revoke the current system of democracy that has been wholly transplanted from foreign nations. Instead, we must now build

a democracy that is appropriate for the special circumstances and characteristics of Thailand- a Thai-style democracy.”

Patronizing to this conundrum, General Prayuth Chan-o-cha illuminate the following in 2018 “Our nation cannot afford further conflict. We certainly must have democracy but it is Thai-style democracy. We must not break rules” the key word according to the prime minister seems to be conflict that Thai-style democracy should be avoided from disagreement. There are 2 ways to evade the scrimmage in politics and society in Thailand.

First, it ensures that all Thai people believe the same way. This is not only unconventional but it is also impossible.

Second, it pretends no conflict exists either through impenetrability or put down of differing opinions that challenge the dominant communication.

In reality, both interpretations cannot honestly bring about a conflict free society. In order to achieve a conflict-free political system, Thais should double their attempts to learn to coexist with political disputes and to determine a peaceful conflict. It should not be get rid of people who think differently and variously in the society, no relinquishment of the others perennially the censorship and quaver and no upwards military coup.

Even though Thailand's military junta has been an officially elected. Its hold on power displays the country politics are a baffling in hybrid of authoritarianism and democracy. Thailand came under by the military rules posterior a coup led by General Prayuth Chan-o-cha removing Yingluck Shinawatra's from power in 2014. He made himself to become a prime minister officially, and has ruled, ever since the head of an authoritarian of military junta.

After the 2019 election victory, this military rule has gone hybrid. General Prayuth is no longer a self-appointed strongman, but a democratically elected prime minister. Although Prayuth direct military rule is coming to an end, the political scenario has become perplexing and complicated. So, in the words of one senator appointed by the junta, it is a "democratic dictatorship."

The Thai junta harden its long-term hold on the power by act a calculated and strict plan. It began by dramatics a coup that take advantage a pendulous and deeply portion political environment. Then the junta appointed lawmakers to draft new rules for a military sponsored constitution in the future.

Although Southeast Asia is often subject to episodic or country-focused reports about whether democracy is increasing or decreasing, the region has in reality long been home to a hybrid of regime types and variable societal pressures beyond the state. This makes assessing the importance of individual developments or extrapolating single linear patterns from perceived markers or litmus tests more difficult.

Only the last couple of years have seen this play out. The opening of Myanmar in 2011 and the victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) of Aung San Suu Kyi in the 2015 elections were a historic and substantial democratic triumph for the nation and the area, but it also revealed the major problems of governance that stayed beyond the litmus test and below the stage of the state, with the Rohingya crisis in particular. And while politics in the region's one-party communist governments such as Vietnam tend to concentrate little beyond traditional signs such as party conferences or congresses, heavy government demonstrations and private elite demonstrations have occasionally disclosed that the more significant indicators of political development can often be hidden.

True to form, the discussion on the topic has already been simplistically dominated by a focus on planned elections in Indonesia and Thailand in 2019. While there is no doubt, of course, that these elections are important in and of themselves, it should be borne in mind that they will be the result of continuing, broader developments that will also continue thereafter.

II. CONCLUSION

Thai political life's alarms and excursions, coups and countercoups, constitutional shuffling, and madcap elections suggest confused chaos. At the same time, a slightly more penetrating observation shows the presence of the same rulers, much of the same law, and most of the same organizations year after year. The most intense moment a coup d'état brought individuals but their protégés or former colleagues. New constitutions have reiterated much of the ancient word by word. The state of affairs appears to be a constant paradoxical stable instability, an inconstant to authority not the same.

Then, what are the impulses for movement? What are the forces to change? What is the shape of stability? The stability of Thai society, which is the bedrock of Thai politics, is to be explained by its easy composition, composed of an exceptionally big agrarian segment and a tiny governing class. These two groups communicate in a tenuous way so that the smaller does not irritate the bigger. To know the stability of the agreement, the character of the

connection between the two must be fully valued. The rural agricultural segment is geographically segregated from the urban governing segment. In the main, the agrarian section is landowning and survives through a quasi-subsistence economy. The ruling segment is salaried (when its members own property, this is usually urban or suburban) and lives on a cash economy. The cash for government comes from levies on rice exports imported goods which fall indirectly on the agrarian segment. The agrarian segment is uneducated not illiterate), and the ruling group is educated.

This piece suggests that there are 3 key descriptions for the amazing results of the 2019 election consisting of the electoral system designed to mortalize large political parties such as Pheu Thai and the Democratic Party, but which resulted in advantages in middle-sized parties such as the Future Forward Party. The erroneous campaign stratagem of older political parties such as the Democratic Party and Pheu Thai, which linked to current strongholds of voters but failed to expand them to contain the fresh demographics of voters. Shifts in the demographics of voters, along with the exigency of a new generation of first-time voters who came out in advocate of parties evidently opposed to military rule such as Future Forward but turned their backs on parties who were previously representatives of the middle-class such as the Democrats.

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